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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the moderating effect of pre-listing investor demand on the direct 
influence of lockup provision and institutional investors' participation on flipping 
activity. By definition, flipping activity is a liquidation of IPOs by new shareholders 
during the first few trading days. If flipping activity is done substantially, it has potential 
to erode wealth of the issuing companies and shareholders. To reduce such adverse 
effects, issuers and underwriters could restrict availability of tradable shares in the 
immediate aftermarket by relying on the direct restrictive role of lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation. However, the role of restricting supply of IPOs in 
the immediate aftermarket could be hindered if the IPOs are highly demanded. The shift 
of the demand curve to the right when supply of the IPOs is restricted should induce a 
new equilibrium at a higher price level. The resulting price appreciation will motivate 
investors to flip to optimize their returns, pushing flipping activity to a higher level. 
Using data of 370 Malaysian IPOs covering the period from January 2000 to December 
2012, this study finds that pre-listing investor demand does moderate the role of lockup 
provision (period) and institutional investors' participation in restricting flipping activity 
but in the opposite manner. 
 
Keywords: flipping activity, lockup provision, institutional investors' participation, pre-
listing investor demand, Malaysian IPO market 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Compared to the voluminous studies on IPO abnormal initial return that focus on 
the pricing aspect of IPOs, studies that examine the quantity or volume aspect of 
IPOs have only recently begun to emerge. This attention is lagged despite the fact 
that IPO markets have been reporting an extraordinarily high trading volume 
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during the first few days of listing relative to the rest of the days (Abdul-Rahim, 
Sapian, Yong, & Auzairy, 2013; Aggarwal, 2003; Ellis, 2006; Islam & Munira, 
2004). Aggarwal (2003) and Ellis (2006) document that in the US IPO market, 
mean trading volumes are as high as 81.97% and 76% in the first and second 
trading days, respectively. Figure 1 demonstrates that for the period from 2000 to 
2012, the Malaysian IPO market has not been spared by this tsunami-like trading 
wave. Kayani and Amjad (2011) and Reese (1998) found abnormally high initial 
returns and trading volume in IPO immediate aftermarket but mostly in cases of 
highly demanded IPOs. Based on these findings, it seems reasonable to propose 
that the anomalous behaviour of IPOs should also be examined from the volume 
perspective. The proposition is particularly supported by the fact that scant 
evidence has been established for trading activity in IPOs' early aftermarkets 
(e.g., Ellul & Pagano, 2006; Zheng & Li, 2008). 
 
In examining the anomalous behaviour of IPOs during the first few 
trading days from the volume perspective, this study takes the stand that the 
heavy trading activity is caused by flippers (Aggarwal, 2003; Ellis, 2006). 
Flippers are defined as new investors who receive allocations of IPO shares 
during the offering and immediately dispose their allocations in the first few 
trading days (Aggarwal, 2003; Ellis, 2006). Accordingly, flipping is referred to as 
the activity of selling shares that are subscribed in an IPO within a short period 
after listing (Bayley, Lee, & Walter, 2006). To some extent, flipping activity is 
favoured because it offers a riskless way for investors to make quick profits 
(Chong, Ali, & Ahmad, 2009; Gounopoulos, 2006) and improves the early IPO 
aftermarket liquidity (Boehmer & Fishe, 2000; Sapian, Abdul Rahim, & Yong, 
2013). 
 
Although its positive effects are favoured, flipping activity also has 
adverse effects that can be damaging if it is left uncontrolled. If it is excessive, 
flipping activity can destroy firms' value and shareholders' wealth because it 
creates a sudden and substantial flow of new shares that could drag price of the 
IPOs down below its fair value (Fishe, 2002; Gounopoulos, 2006). The adverse 
effect of excessive flipping activity is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the 
trend of the opening price versus the offer price of an IPO. As illustrated in the 
figure, the average opening prices of 310 IPOs (issued between 2000 and 2012) 
during the first 20 days after listing are at their highest points on the first and 
second trading days. From the third day onward, the opening price continues to 
decline at a relatively fast rate, reaching the break-even point in only 11 days. 
Note that when the trading volume increases slightly on the seventh trading day 
(Figure 1), the opening price drops by a greater percentage on the eighth day. The 
downward trend in the price of the IPOs is consistently in tandem with the 
increases in the supply of the new shares in the immediate aftermarket, which is 
argued in this study to be largely contributed by flippers. Based on this evidence, 
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IPO issuers and underwriters have strong incentives to prevent excessive flipping 
activity. Issuers are subject to close scrutiny from their debt holders and 
shareholders, and a substantial decline in firms' value reduces their ability to raise 
capital in favourable terms in the future. Underwriters' reputation, in the 
meantime, depends not only on the success of the IPOs but also in proving that 
the new shares have been offered at a fair price. Excessive flipping that reduces 
the IPO price to below its fair value (assumed to be the offer price) will make the 
investors unhappy. Unsatisfied investors are more likely to file lawsuits and less 
likely to subscribe to future offerings.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Trend of IPO trading volume for the first 20 days after listing. Mean trading 
volume is estimated based on the total number of shares traded (in thousand) on the 
respective trading day divided by 310 companies 
(Source: Bursa Malaysia, 2012; DataStream Database, 2012) 
 
Although stopping investors from flipping their IPOs is not legally an 
option, the decision of the Security Commission of Malaysia (SC) to impose a 
mandatory lockup provision on 3 May 1999 is viewed as an effort that could 
control flipping activities to a certain extent. Lockup provision, also known as 
share moratorium in Malaysia, prohibits promoters of IPOs from selling all or a 
portion of their shareholdings during a lockup period (Wan Hussin, 2005). 
Although the priority for lockup provision is to ensure the promoters (normally 
the original owners or founders of the issuing companies) continue to be 
responsible for the wellbeing of the company at least during the lockup period, 
this provision can also be regarded as a tool to control the supply of new shares 
that can be sold in the immediate aftermarket when the shares are eligible for 
trading (Garfinkle, Malkiel, & Bontas, 2002; Ofek & Richardson, 2000). This is 
supported by the fact that although lockup provision in the Malaysian IPO market 
is mandatory, the preliminary observation of this study shows that most of the 
companies commit to locking a higher portion of shares than they are required to, 
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implying that this action will help limit an even higher portion of tradable shares 
from being flipped.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trend of IPO opening prices in the first 20 days after listing.  Average opening 
price is calculated based on the total opening price against 310 companies issued from 
January 2000 until September 2012. Average offer price is calculated based on the total 
offer price against 310 companies. 
(Sources: Bursa Malaysia and DataStream Database) 
 
 
A similar restrictive role is also expected for institutional investors 
because they are a group of long-term shareholders who are considered loyal to 
their companies and have less motivation to sell their shares instantly (Aggarwal, 
2003; Gounopoulos, 2006). In fact, major institutional investors in the Malaysian 
IPO market, such as Employees Provident Fund, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
and Social Security Organization, are funds management companies that invest in 
the stock market to protect shareholders' interests (Abdul Wahab, How, & 
Verhoeven, 2008) through their long-term commitment. Institutional investors 
are also argued to prefer gradual long-term dividends instead of quick returns 
from price appreciation in the early aftermarket (Sapian, Abdul Rahim, & Yong, 
2012). Therefore, following the basic demand-supply rule, lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation should have a direct role in reducing the level 
of flipping activity via their effects in restricting the supply of the new shares in 
the immediate aftermarket. 
 
Nonetheless, in proposing the effectiveness of lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation in restricting the supply of IPOs in the 
immediate aftermarket for flipping activity, the argument seems incomplete 
without properly considering the effect of demand on IPOs. When the restricted 
supply coupled with the shift of the demand curve to the right brings the price of 
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the newly listed IPOs to a new higher equilibrium level, investors will be more 
motivated to flip. In other words, the resulting price appreciation will generate 
flipping activity that is higher than normal. This proposition is in line with 
previous studies (e.g., Kayani & Amjad, 2011; Reese, 1998) that reveal that both 
initial returns and initial trading volume are substantial, particularly in cases in 
which the investors' demand on IPOs is high. Overall, this study proposes that 
flipping activity can be directly influenced by lockup provision and institutional 
investors' participation, but the influence can be moderated by investor demand.   
 
Specifically, this study attempts to examine the restrictive role of lockup 
provision (ratio and period) and institutional investors on flipping activity and 
whether investor demand moderates such roles. This study contributes to the 
literature on IPO because to the best knowledge of this study, this issue has never 
before been addressed. In testing these relationships, some variables that have 
been found to be significant in influencing flipping activity will be controlled for. 
In the context of Malaysian IPOs, three of the earliest studies on flipping activity 
(Chong et al., 2009, 2011; Chong, 2009) focused on behavioural theories, such as 
noise signals and disposition effects, as explanations for flipping activities, 
whereas Yong (2010) focuses on only the correlation between institutional 
investors' participation and aftermarket investor behaviour. A recent study by 
Abdul-Rahim et al. (2013) focuses on flipping activity during the first five 
trading days to measure flipping activity, whereas this study focuses on flipping 
activity on the first trading day, which is when such trading activities seem most 
prevalent (Figure 1). 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
IPO Flipping Activity  
 
Studies on flipping activity are conducted primarily in developed markets, 
particularly in the US. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999) and Bash (2001) 
examine both underwriters' pricing error and flipping in finding explanations for 
the short- and medium-term performance of IPOs. Both studies find that flipping 
activity is not the main factor for the poor aftermarket performance; instead, it is 
the result of the unfavourable pricing. The studies also find that flipping is 
significantly negatively explained by initial returns and market capitalisation, and 
institutions choose to flip more poor IPOs. Instead of finding explanations about 
the role of flipping activity on IPO returns, Aggarwal (2003) and Gounopoulos 
(2006) focus on the predictors of flipping activity. In a sample of 617 IPOs from 
May to June 1998, Aggarwal (2003) finds that more hot IPOs are flipped by 
institutional investors. Gounopoulos (2006), who examines 51 IPOs from 2003 to 
2004, reports results similar to those of Krigman et al. (1999) and Bash (2001). 
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Overall, in the US, the majority of studies suggest that institutions are more 
aggressive in their flipping activity when their participation is "needed" in less 
attractive IPOs, indicating that flipping is a response to overpriced IPOs in this 
market.  
 
The evidence reported by Bayley et al. (2006) in Australia shows that hot 
IPOs are flipped more frequently than cold IPOs. This contradicts the results of 
the majority in the US IPO market. Furthermore, Bayley et al. (2006), who 
examine 457 IPOs from 1995 to 2000, find a negative relationship between issue 
size and flipping activity during the first three trading days. In the Dhaka IPO 
Market, Islam and Munira (2004), who examine 96 IPOs issued from 1994 to 
2001, find a significant negative relationship between issue size and flipping 
activity.  
 
In the case of Malaysian IPOs, studies on flipping activity begin with 
Chong et al. (2009) and Chong (2009). Using 132 IPOs listed on the Main Board 
of Bursa Malaysia from 1991 to 2003, the studies examine the role of noise 
effects and disposition effects on flipping activity. Both effects, which are 
proxied by the level of initial returns, show a significant positive influence on 
flipping activity. The studies also find a significant negative association between 
issue size and flipping activity. Yong (2010), who examines 219 IPOs listed 
between 2004 and 2007, finds that initial return is correlated with flipping 
activity. Another study by Chong et al. (2011) finds that representative heuristics 
are negatively associated with flipping activity. Sapian et al. (2012) find that the 
flipping activity of 187 IPOs issued from June 2003 to December 2008 is 
positively associated with initial return but negatively associated with offer size. 
Abdul-Rahim et al. (2013), who examine 243 IPOs during a similar time frame, 
find similar results. Overall, earlier studies on flipping activity in Malaysia and in 
other markets show that several factors have been found to be significant in 
explaining flipping activity. However, none has exclusively examined the role of 
lockup provision and institutional investors' participation in flipping activity and 
the indirect role of investor demand on these relationships. 
 
IPO Lockup Provision 
 
In studies on the lockup period, the evidence is partially skewed to the net effect 
of the lockup period at the lockup expiry that is on the IPO trading volume and 
the long-term return (Ofek & Richardson, 2000; Field & Hanka, 2001; Garfinkle 
et al., 2002; Nowack, 2004; Georgen, Mazouz, & Yin, 2010; Hakim, Lypny, & 
Bharbra, 2012). Ofek and Richardson (2000) use 1662 US IPOs from 1996 to 
1998 to investigate the effect of lockup provision on trading volume and price 
reaction at the expiry date. Learning that the lockup provision prevents the 
immediate sales of a portion of shares for a pre-specified time, the supply of 
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shares will be controlled initially but will have a large positive shift on the expiry 
day. This will create a positive effect on trading volume and downward pressure 
on price due to excessive sales of the unlocked shares by shareholders. In the 
finding, the study provides evidence that the expiration of lockup provision 
increases up to 40% of trading volume and drops to 3% of the IPO price. Field 
and Hanka (2001) find similar results for 1948 US IPO from 1988 to 1997.  
 
Another similar finding is found in Garfinkle et al. (2002) and Nowack 
(2004). Using a sample of 775 US IPOs from 1977 to 1999, Garfinkle et al. 
(2002) report that trading volume increases to 81% on the lockup expiry. The 
study also documents a drop of 4.47% in IPO price on the unlock date. This 
finding further implies that the sudden supply of tradable shares does have some 
influence on the trading volume and the price of the IPOs. The adverse effect of 
lockup provision on price on the expiration date is also supported by Nowack 
(2004). Focusing on 142 German IPOs, Nowack (2004) finds that the expiration 
of lockup provision increases 25% of the trading volume. Although the focus of 
the four studies is on the effect lockup provision on the expiration date, all 
studies suggest that lockup provision is effective in limiting the supply of shares 
and in producing a higher-than-normal price of IPOs in the early aftermarket. 
 
Georgen et al. (2010) examine the volume, price and bid-ask spread 
around the expiry of lockup provision. Using 272 IPOs listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange for the period from 1999 to 2005, the study finds no significant 
change in the price of the shares and therefore concludes that the market does not 
react to the expiration of the lockup period. Georgen et al. (2010) suggest that 
this is likely because most Hong Kong IPO firms are controlled by one or two 
non-institutional investors. These controlling shareholders are not likely to sell 
their shares after the lockup period expires because doing so will deplete their 
control over the firm. However, this conjecture is not empirically supported by 
the results, which show that trading volume reports a significant increase of 
76.2% on the first day of lockup expiration. In contrast to Georgen et al. (2010), a 
recent finding by Hakim et al. (2012) shows that the IPO cumulative abnormal 
return increases by 1.6%, but trading volume reduces, particularly for family-
oriented firms at lockup expiry. Overall, previous studies on lockup provision 
suggest that it has a potentially significant role in restricting the sudden supply of 
new shares in the early aftermarket. This can be deducted based on the general 
trends of the trading volume, which increases, and the price of shares, which 
decreases on the lockup expiration day.  
 
Institutional Investors' Participation 
 
Some studies (e.g., Aggarwal & Dahiya, 2000; Stoughton & Zechner, 1998) posit 
that favouring institutional investors in the allocation of IPOs will increase the 
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likelihood of the success of the issues and the increase the firm's value during an 
IPO because this group of investors is more capable of revealing private 
information about the issues and the issuers. Aggarwal (2003) and Gounopoulos 
(2006) offer a slightly different argument on the favouritism of institutional 
investors. They suggest that institutional investors are the "strong hand" because 
they are more loyal to the companies (not entirely driven by quick profit-making 
opportunities) and can therefore be relied upon as long-term investors. Krigman 
et al. (1999) and Bash (2001) empirically find that institutional investors 
consistently flip a lesser proportion of their allocated shares than individual 
investors, particularly on hot IPOs. Although some other studies (e.g., Aggarwal, 
2003; Islam & Munira, 2004) find that institutional investors consistently flip a 
larger portion of their allocated shares than individual investors, it is unlikely that 
institutional investors can persistently exploit the favourable treatment in IPO 
allocation once the issuers and underwriters learn that the strategy, which favours 
institutional investors, backfires on the firm. In other words, institutional 
investors that repeatedly flip their shares are at risk of being blacklisted by 
underwriters in future IPOs and by the issuers in their seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs). However, institutional investors are not likely to face such penalties if 
their actions are backed by valid reasons. For instance, institutional investors in 
the US tend to flip IPOs that will perform poorly in the future (Krigman et al., 
1999; Bash, 2001) or IPOs that are overpriced (Gounopoulos, 2006; Tran, Kalev, 
& Westerholm, 2007). 
 
In the case of the Malaysian IPO market, the higher participation of 
institutional investors is expected to reduce flipping activity. The main 
institutional investors in Malaysia are pension funds, fund management firms and 
other financial institutions that invest in common stocks to fulfil certain asset 
allocations in their portfolios. An opportunity to acquire stocks at favourable 
prices during IPOs is an advantage that investors (including institutional ones) 
are not likely to forego, particularly when the market is still characterised as thin 
and when the substitute, particularly the bond market, is practically limited. In 
short, this study advances a proposition that is in line with Aggarwal (2003) and 
Gounopoulos (2006), who argue that institutional investors are commonly 
allocated a greater fraction of new shares because of their commitment to hold 
the shares longer. This proposition is also consistent with the argument that 
institutional investors prefer income stream (dividend) over the long term (Sapian 
et al., 2012) rather than instant capital gain. Overall, this study expects the role of 
institutional investors, together with lockup provision, to restrict the number of 
shares to be flipped immediately after the IPO listing.  
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Investor Demand 
 
From the beginning, this study argues that lockup provision (period and ratio) 
and institutional investors' participation directly influence flipping activity 
because they limit the supply of IPOs in the immediate aftermarket. However, 
discussing the effect of supply seems incomplete without simultaneously 
examining the effect of demand on the respective IPOs. The supply-demand rule 
suggests that highly demanded IPOs will push flipping activity to a higher level. 
As discussed earlier, the new higher price resulting from the emergence of a new 
equilibrium level will entice investors to flip to grab the opportunity to make a 
profit from the price appreciation. A similar argument on the effect of supply and 
demand and the price of IPOs (and flipping activity) is also forwarded by Alanazi 
and Liu (2013). The results of previous studies (e.g., Chahine, 2007; Ismail, 
Abidin, & Nasruddin, 1993; Yong & Isa, 2003) that find a positive association 
between investor demand and initial return (price appreciates) and other studies 
(Kayani & Amjad, 2011; Reese, 1998) that find a higher trading volume when 
the level of the investor demand is higher are good evidence in support of this 
supposition. As further supported by Fishe (2002), flipping activity greatly relies 
on the level of demand for the issues. Specifically, the price of IPOs will rise 
(fall) if there is a sufficient (insufficient) demand on the issues. In short, this 
study proposes that the effect of lockup provision and institutional investors' 
participation on flipping activity is weaker in IPOs that are greatly demanded.  
 
This study argues that demand on IPOs further increases when there is a 
stringent practice of lockup provision i.e., a longer lockup period and a higher 
lockup ratio. Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005) posit that insiders are 
normally in the best position to understand the current condition and foresee the 
growth prospects of the companies. On that basis, insiders' action in locking their 
shares voluntarily must be interpreted as a good signal about the companies 
because the signal is costly and difficult to replicate for low-quality companies. 
Similarly, Aggarwal, Liu and Rhee (2008) posit that demand on IPOs will also 
increase when the IPOs are largely offered to institutional investors. Because 
institutional investors are considered information-opaque, they should invest in 
only assets that are expected to produce greater wealth in the future. Therefore, 
their high participation in the IPOs also sends a good signal about the issuing 
companies. The signals in lockup provision and institutional investors' 
participation would therefore create a bandwagon effect or fads effect, 
particularly from the free riders who would quickly jump onto the bandwagon to 
get their share of the returns. In turn, the additional demand from the investors 
would create an upward pressure on the price of the IPOs that may be high 
enough for any investors to miss. In brief, although lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation in IPOs are initially predicted to have a 
negative effect on flipping activity, these relationships may be moderated if the 
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investors' demand is high. In forwarding the moderating effect of investor 
demand, this study proposes that demand on IPOs prior to listing is likely to 
persist in the IPOs' immediate aftermarket. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Size and Procedures 
 
The sample of IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia will be selected from a study period 
that spans a period of 13 years, from January 2000 to December 2012. The study 
period starts in January 2000 because the mandatory lockup provision on IPO 
companies was made effective on 3 May 1999. The advantage of starting in the 
year 2000 is also that private placement issue only started to gain momentum in 
2001. The final sample of 370 IPOs is generated after excluding a total of 77 
unaffected companies (i.e., companies that are not subjected to and/or are 
exempted from the mandatory lockup requirement) because these companies do 
not have information on lockup provision. This study also excludes all rare-type 
IPOs, IPOs with missing value and IPOs issued by financial institutions and 
insurance companies due to the different format of financial statements. The data 
for this study are sourced from the prospectuses of the IPO companies, the 
website of Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), 
and the Bloomberg and DataStream databases. 
 
Definition and Measures  
 
Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable in this study is the flipping activity. Due to the 
inaccessibility of data on flippers in the Malaysian IPO market, this study 
measures flipping activity with two proxies; (i) the percentage of opening day 
trading volume divided by the number of IPO shares issued and, (ii) the 
percentage of the opening day trading volume divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding:  
 
iii NOSHIVOLFLIPstand /=   (1i) 
iii NOSHVOLFLIPmod /=   (1ii) 
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where 
 
VOLi,t =  trading volume of the ith issuer on the first 
trading day,  
NOSHIi = number of IPO shares issued for the ith issuer, 
and 
NOSHi = number of total shares outstanding for the ith 
issuer after the IPO. 
 
Equation (1i) represents the measure of flipping activity that has 
commonly been used in past studies (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2013; Chong et al., 
2009; Krigman et al., 1999; Yong, 2010), whereas Equation (1ii) is the 
modification that is initiated by this study. Because the actual flipping activity is 
not observable, the trading volume-based proxy must recognise that (i) the 
activity of flipping is not restricted to only the shares issued at IPO but can also 
involve pre-IPO shares, and (ii) the act of selling the IPOs during the first few 
days of listing is not restricted to only investors who are allocated the new shares 
at the IPO (actual flippers) but also pre-IPO shareholders who are not affected by 
the mandatory lockup provision. In the context of this study, pre-IPO shares refer 
specifically to shares that have been issued to the founders and other original 
shareholders prior to the respective company's decision to go public. 
Accordingly, any shares of the original shareholders (that are not offered for sale 
during the IPO and are not affected by the lock-up provision) that are traded 
during the first (few) trading days could also contribute to the reported high 
trading activities in the immediate aftermarket. Failure to consider trading by 
these pre-IPO shareholders in measuring flipping activity based on trading 
volume somehow leads to an overestimation of activity by the actual flippers. 
Furthermore, regardless of which shares (new or existing) are traded, the 
resulting flipping activity in general should have a similar effect on the price of 
the IPO. This argument is relevant in markets such as Malaysia, where data on 
flippers are not available to differentiate the trading activity of pre-IPO 
shareholders from that of flippers (subscribers who have acquired the new shares 
at the IPO). In short, recognising that flipping activity can be equally contributed 
by new shareholders and pre-IPO shareholders, this study proposes a 
modification of the standard definition of flippers and flipping activity, as 
depicted in Equation (1ii). 
 
Independent variables  
 
The main independent variables in this study are lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation. Lockup provision is examined using two 
parameters: lockup period (LUPER) and lockup ratio (LURAT). The lockup 
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period is the length of time that the shares need to be retained by the major 
shareholders of the issuing companies starting from the date of the listing. The 
data on the lockup period are collected from the company's prospectus and are 
standardised in number of days. That is, 
 
LUPERi  =  number of days the shares are held by major 
shareholders of the ith issuer.  
 
The second parameter of lockup provision is lockup ratio (LURAT). This ratio is 
the percentage of promoters' shares that cannot be disposed upon the listing of 
IPOs. 
 
LURATi =  percentage of shares locked by major shareholders of 
the ith issuer.  
 
In Malaysia, IPOs can be offered in two categories: private placement 
and non-private placement. Private placement is the type of IPOs that are 
specially offered to institutional investors. To measure institutional investors' 
participation (INSTRAT), this study divides the total number of shares issued in 
the private placement category against the total number of shares issued (Abdul-
Rahim et al. 2013; Sapian et al., 2012; Yong, 2010). That is: 
  
iii NOSHIPRIPLAINSTRAT /=      (2) 
 where   
PRIPLAi, = number of shares in private placement IPOs of the ith issuer, 
and 
NOSHIi = total number of shares issued for the ith issuer. 
Moderating variable 
 
Investor demand (plID), one of the explanatory variables in this study, 
specifically refers to the demand on the IPOs prior to listing (Sow-Wah & Yong, 
2011). It is commonly estimated based on the over-subscription ratio (OSR; 
Abdul-Rahim et al., 2013; Sow-Wah & Yong, 2011), which is calculated as in 
Equation (3):  
 
iiii NOSHISUBSOSRplID /==                                     (3) 
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 where     
         
SUBSi, = total of shares subscribed, and 
 
NOSHIi = total number of shares issued for the ith issuer. 
 
The moderating effect of pre-listing investor demand on the relationship 
between lockup provision variables and flipping activity is examined by creating 
a pair of interaction variables (i.e., plID × LURAT and plID × LUPER). Similarly, 
an interaction variable (plID × INSTRAT) is used to test the moderating effect of 
pre-listing investor demand on the relationship between institutional investors' 
participation and flipping activity. 
  
Control variables 
 
In examining the influence of lockup parameters and institutional investors' 
participation on flipping activity and the moderating effect of investor demand, 
this study controls for the effect of other factors that are widely tested in studies 
of flipping activity. These factors can be classified into IPO-specific or firm-
specific factors, including the initial return, the size of the IPO, the age and sector 
of the company, and the market factors, including the overall stock market 
condition, the IPO market condition and heuristic representation (Aggarwal, 
2003; Bayley et al., 2006; Chong et al., 2009; Gounopoulos, 2006; Tran et al., 
2007; Yong, 2010). Price appreciation (PA), or initial return, is measured as the 
percentage change from the IPO offer price to its closing price on the first listing 
day (Booth & Chua, 1996; Yong, 1991). The size of IPOs (OFFSIZ) is measured 
as the natural log of the total number of shares offered for an IPO multiplied by 
its offer price (ln (NOSHI × POFFER). Company age (AGE) is the time length that 
a company has been incorporated prior to listing measured in years (Abdul-
Rahim et al., 2012). A dummy industry representing technology companies 
(DTECH) is also controlled for in this study  in consideration of the argument by 
Tran et al. (2007) that certain types of industries impose a different degree of risk 
for IPOs. In the context of the Malaysian market, technology companies are 
commonly recognised to exhibit high-growth and high-risk profiles. 
 
The market condition, which reflects the sentiments of the investors, can 
be observed from the condition of the stock market (STOMKT) in general, the 
IPO market itself (IPOMKT) and the condition of the IPO market around the 
issuance of the IPO. The overall stock market condition (STOMKT; McKenzie, 
2007) is measured based on the average one-week return of the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia EMAS Index. This study divides the IPO market condition into "hot" 
and "cold" issue markets. A dummy variable takes a value of 1 (hot market) if the 
IPO size exceeds the mean of the sample issue size (Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, 
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Menendez, & Schiereck, 2005; Kooli & Suret, 2004). Meanwhile, heuristic 
representation is measured by the mean initial returns of the three most recent 
new issues listed prior to an IPO. Heuristic representation also indicates investor 
sentiment in the IPO market but in a smaller scope. That is, the evaluation of an 
IPO depends to a certain extent on how the market evaluates IPOs that are most 
recently issued (Bayley et al., 2006; Chong et al., 2011). In general, investors are 
less likely to flip their shares when at the time of making a decision; they are 
optimistic about the future, long-term gains of the IPOs. 
 
To examine the role of the lockup period, the lockup ratio and 
institutional investors' participation in flipping activity and the moderating effect 
of pre-listing investor demand on the main relationships, this study uses 
hierarchical cross-sectional regression models, as follows: 
1 2 3 4
1 ,i i i i i l l
L
FLIP LURAT LUPER INSTRAT plID CVi lα β β β β β ε=
= + + + + + +∑  
  
(4i) 
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(4ii) 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
where 
 
α	   = constant term,	  
β	   = estimated coefficient or factor loading,	  
FLIPi	   = flipping ratio of the ith issuing company,	  
LURAT i	   = the percentage of shares locked in for the ith issuing 
company, 
LUPER i	   = the length of lockup provision for the ith issuing 
company, 
INSTRATi	   = institutional investors' participation ratio in the ith 
issue,	  
plID i	   = pre-listing investor demand in the ith issue,	  
plID × LURAT	   = interaction between pre-listing investor demand and 
lockup ratio,	  
plID × LUPER	   = interaction between pre-listing investor demand and 
lockup period,	  
plID × INSTRAT	   = interaction between pre-listing investor demand and 
institutional investors' participation, 	  
CVl	   = control variables l … L, which are discussed earlier 
in "control variables" , and	  
ε	   = error term. 	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Equation (4i) represents the initial test of the influence of lockup provision and 
institutional investors' participation on flipping activity. Equation (4ii) is the test 
on the moderating effect of pre-listing investor demand (plID) on those main 
relationships. 
  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Preliminary Finding 
 
Table 1 provides the summary characteristics of the sample and data used in this 
study. Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample of IPOs listed 
from January 2000 to December 2012 on Bursa Malaysia. As reported, there 
were a total of 495 IPOs issued during the study period. As stated in earlier, 77 
IPOs are excluded based on the selection criteria. To minimise the influence of 
outliers in the sample, an additional 48 IPOs are excluded from the initial sample, 
producing a final sample of 370 IPOs.  
 
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the full 
sample. As reported in Panel B of Table 1, the mean standard flipping activity 
(58.84%) is three times higher than the mean modified flipping activity (19.51%). 
For ease of discussion, standard flipping activity and modified flipping activity 
are simplified as standFLIP and modFLIP. Comparing standFLIP and modFLIP 
in this study with those reported in the US market shows that the figures are 
comparable. For instance, 45.40% is documented by Krigman et al. (1999), 
48.10% by Bash (2001), 15% by Aggarwal (2003), 24.3% by Gounopoulos 
(2006) and 22% by Tran et al. (2007), representing flipping activity in a period 
that extends from 1988 to 2004. Panel B of Table 1 also reports that the mean 
standFLIP ranges from zero to 99.67%, whereas the mean modFLIP ranges from 
zero to 55%. In brief, the modFLIP provides a more reasonable estimation of 
flipping activity in a sample of stocks that are subject to a lockup provision. 
 
In regard to the independent variables, Panel B of Table 1 reports that the 
lockup ratio (LURAT) and the lockup period (LUPER) are on average 56.24% 
and 322 days, respectively. LURAT and LUPER range from 24.46% to 83.53% 
and from 180 days to 360 days, respectively. The mean LURAT found in this 
study appears to be more than twice the average of 20% in an earlier study of 
Malaysian IPOs (Wan Hussin, 2005) from August 1996 to June 2000. Compared 
with those reported in developed markets, smaller LURAT but longer LUPER are 
found in the Malaysian market. In the US, the average LUPER is only 163 days 
according to Brau et al. (2005) and 187 days according to Field and Hanka 
(2001), but the mean LURAT is as high as the 83.90% reported by Brav and 
Gompers (2003) and 93.4% reported by Brau, Carter, Christophe and Key 
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(2004). Georgen, Renneboog and Khurshed (2006) also report a high LURAT 
(68.14%) in the Australian IPO market.  
 
Table 1 
Sample distribution and characteristics  
 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs 
Year Population Sample Percentage 
2000 38 28 7.56 
2001 20 13 3.51 
2002 51 33 8.91 
2003 58 45 12.2 
2004 72 60 16.2 
2005 79 60 16.2 
2006 40 30 8.11 
2007 26 12 3.24 
2008 23 15 4.1 
2009 14 12 3.24 
2010 29 26 7.02 
2011 28 24 6.49 
2012 17 12 3.24 
Total 495 370 100 
Panel B: Sample Characteristics 
 Mean S.D.  Min. Max. 
Standard flipping activity (%) 58.84 0.37 0.00 99.67 
Modified flipping activity 
(%) 
19.51 0.16 0.00 55.00 
Lockup ratio (%) 56.24 0.09 24.46 83.53 
Lockup period (days) 322 73.44 180 360 
Institutional investors' 
participation (%) 
44.87 0.33 0.00 100 
Price appreciation (%) 28.55 0.56 –68.13 404.17 
Offer size (units million) 75.44 2.34 2 250 
Over-subscription ratio 
(times) 
32.55 44.97 –0.89 263.42 
Stock market condition (%) 0.76 0.37 –1.55 107.27 
Heuristic representation (%) 27.41 0.36 –37.93 164.23 
Company age (years) 4.31 5.08 0 39 
 
Note: Sample size (N) = 370. Both of the flipping activity measures are estimated on the first trading day. 
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The average participation of institutional investors (INSTRAT) is 44.87%, 
ranging from 0% to 100%, in which cases the IPOs are totally offered through 
private placement issue. The mean institutional investors' participation found in 
this study is slightly greater than that reported earlier in Malaysia, demonstrating 
that the participation of institutional investors in Malaysia is experiencing an 
uptrend. Two recent studies report means of 32.10% (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2013) 
and 33.40% (Sapian et al., 2012), both during the period from 2003 to 2008. The 
average OSR (pre-listing investor demand) of the IPOs is 32.55 times that during 
the sample period, ranging from a minimum of –0.89 times to a maximum of 
263.42 times. The mean is lower than 39.12 times the over-subscription ratio 
reported during the period of 2004 to 2007 (Yong, 2010), a figure more recently 
reported to be 40.29 times (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2013) and 43.55 times (Sapian et 
al., 2012). The higher pre-listing investor demand reported recently, however, is 
much lower than that reported in the 80s and 90s. For that era, Dawson (1987) 
and Yong (1991) report an investor demand of 46 times.  
 
The correlations among variables used in this study are presented in 
Table 2. Specifically, a bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient analysis is used 
to identify the threat of multicollinearity. Table 2 shows that the strength of the 
correlations among independent variables is weak; values of the correlation are 
always less than 0.45, much lower than the 0.90 cut-off point (Asteriou & Hall, 
2007). An exception is the correlation between standFLIP and modFLIP (0.87). 
However, this correlation is not relevant in assessing the threat of the 
multicollinearity issue because the two are alternative measurements of flipping 
activity. That is, only one will be used in any regression model, interchangeably. 
Upon checking for the multicollinearity issue, Equation (4i) and Equation (4ii), 
which consist of these variables, are tested for further analysis specifically 
through multiple regression procedures. Diagnostic tests including tests on 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and model specification are first performed to 
ensure that the results are generated from regression models that fulfil OLS 
assumptions.  
 
Main Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
 
As discussed earlier, this study proposes that pre-listing investor demand (plID) 
moderates the restrictive role of lockup provision (period and ratio) and 
institutional investors' participation in flipping activity. In other words, the high 
level of IPO demand prior to listing is expected to weaken the role of lockup 
provision and institutional investors' participation in restricting flipping activity. 
Statistically, the explanatory power (t-statistics and p-value) of LUPER, LURAT 
and INSTRAT is predicted to reduce when the interaction terms are incorporated 
in the models. However, the conclusion on the presence of the moderating effect 
of pre-listing investor demand can be made only when there is a significant 
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interaction between pre-listing investor demand and the respective main 
independent variables (LUPER, LURAT and INSTRAT). Table 3 presents the 
results using four model specifications. Columns (i) and (ii) of Model A report 
results of the moderation using standFLIP as the measure of flipping activity, 
whereas columns (i) and (ii) of Model B present results of the moderation using 
modFLIP. Model A associates with regression Equation (4i), whereas model B is 
from regression Equation (4ii). 
 
Briefly, all models in Table 3 pass the diagnostic tests regarding model 
specification and heteroskedasticity. For autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson in 
all models report values lower than 2. Therefore, the Newey-West Test is used to 
correct for the threat of autocorrelation. In terms of multicollinearity, the original 
VIF produces values greater than 10 (Gujarati, 2003), implying a high potential 
for a collinearity problem. To reduce the threat, this study therefore uses the 
mean-centring variables approach (Aiken & West, 1991). As reported in Table 3, 
the VIF ranges from 1.055 to 2.965, which indicates that the maximum values are 
far below their cut-off point. 
 
Overall, the regression models produce a slightly lower adjusted R-
squared with 11.10% and 11.20% when standFLIP is employed as the 
measurement for flipping activity compared to 11.80% and 12.30% adjusted R-
squared when modFLIP is employed. Despite the difference, the values indicate 
that collectively, all explanatory variables in this study are able to explain at least 
11.00% of the variations in flipping activity on the first trading day. This level of 
goodness-of-fit is satisfactory for the data because it yields an F-value of more 
than 4.347 (p < 0.01) in all regression models.  
 
In terms of the results of the control variables, the price appreciation and 
size of the IPOs are the factors that have a significant and consistent role in 
explaining flipping activity, regardless of flipping activity formulation. Whereas 
price appreciation (PA) is found to significantly relate to flipping activity 
positively, the size of IPOs is related significantly and negatively to flipping 
activity. These results show that investors in the Malaysian IPO market have high 
motivation to flip their shares on the listing day to optimise their returns. The 
findings of this study provide further support for the findings of earlier studies on 
the relationship between price appreciation (or initial return) and flipping activity 
in Malaysia (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2012; Chong et al., 2009; Sapian et al., 2012; 
Yong, 2010). Similar results are found in the US (Aggarwal, 2003), Australia 
(Bayley et al., 2006) and Finland (Tran et al., 2007). Meanwhile, investors tend 
to be more convinced when the IPO size is larger, likely because they associate 
the large issue size with high-quality companies. Alternatively, when there is a 
surplus in the number of shares offered, more demand is already fulfilled prior to 
listing such that the price in the immediate aftermarket is less likely to drive up to 
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motivate investors to sell the new shares immediately. This result is consistent 
with that found earlier in Malaysia (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2012; Chong et al., 
2009; Sapian et al., 2012), Australia (Bayley et al., 2006), Finland (Tran et al., 
2007), and Bangladesh (Islam & Munira, 2004).  
 
Table 2 
Pearson correlation coefficients among variables 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. standFLIP 1 0.870 –0.060 –0.005 0.066 0.162** 0.160** –0.112** 0.193 0.060 0.047 –0.013 
2. modFLIP  1 –0.099 0.089 0.122* 0.172** 0.179** –0.105* 0.231 0.037 –0.012 –0.044 
3. LURAT   1 –0.121* –0.003 –0.109* –0.164** 0.109* 0.062 –0.031 –0.134** 0.065 
4. LUPER    1 –0.024 0.089 0.090 –0.238** 0.352** –0.068 0.167** –0.108* 
5. INSTRAT     1 0.231** 0.056 –0.290** 0.181** 0.064 –0.108* –0.181** 
6. plID      1 0.318* –0.227** 0.122* –0.007 –0.171** 0.000 
7. PA       1 –0.173* –0.023 0.083 0.188** –0.016 
8. OFFSIZ        1 0.111 –0.021 0.015 0.119* 
9. IPOMKT         1 0.148** –0.106* 0.029 
10. STOMKT          1 0.093 0.004 
11. HEUREP           1 0.049 
12. AGE            1 
Notes: standFLIP = standard flipping activity on first trading day; modFLIP = modified flipping activity on first trading day; 
LURAT = lockup ratio; LUPER = lockup period; INSTRAT = Institutional investors' participation; PA = price appreciation or 
initial return (offer to close); SUPPLY = size or Supply of IPOs; IPOMKT = IPO market condition; STOMKT = overall stock 
market condition; HEUREP = Heuristics representation; AGE = company age and the numbers in column headings correspond 
with the number of variables in row. 
 
 
 Table 3 
Result of hierarchical regressions on flipping activity  
 
Independent Variables           Model  A: standFLIP     Model B: modFLIP 
(i) Initial (ii) Moderated (i) Initial (ii) Moderated 
Main Independent Variables    
DLUPER –0.595 
(–3.651)*** 
–0.003 
(–3.779)*** 
–0.161 
(–5.258)*** 
–0.000 
 (–5.715)*** 
LURAT        –1.937 
(–2.570)*** 
–2.016 
(–2.644)*** 
–0.526 
(–4.735)*** 
–0.535 
(–5.185)*** 
INSTRAT  –0.218 
(–1.496) 
–0.235 
      – (1.596) 
–0.019 
– (0.682) 
–0.020 
– (0.884) 
Control Variables    
PA 0.144 
(1.896)** 
0.151 
(1.983)** 
0.044 
(2.399)*** 
0.045 
(2.411)*** 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Independent Variables           Model  A: standFLIP     Model B: modFLIP 
(i) Initial (ii) Moderated (i) Initial (ii) Moderated 
OFFSIZ       –0.210 
(–5.558)*** 
–0.205 
(–5.327)*** 
      –0.031 
(–5.351)*** 
–0.029 
(–4.887)*** 
IPOMKT –0.006 
(–0.069) 
–0.007 
(–0.088) 
0.001 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
STOMKT 0.091 
(0.838) 
0.104 
(0.954) 
0.005 
(0.314) 
0.010 
(0.533) 
HEUREP –0.056 
(–0.090) 
–0.062 
(–0.479) 
–0.039 
(–1.586) 
–0.043 
(–1.781)* 
AGE –0.000 
(–0.090) 
–0.000 
(–0.017) 
–0.001 
– (0.982) 
–0.001 
(–0.973) 
DTECH 0.068 
(0.652) 
0.064 
(0.615) 
0.014 
(0.676) 
0.016 
(0.744) 
plID 0.001 
(1.606)* 
0.001 
(1.349) 
0.000 
(1.836)** 
0.003 
(3.005)*** 
Moderation Variables    
CENDLUPER*CENpl
ID 
 
 
 
–1.61E 
(–1.368) 
 –6.15E 
(–2.924)*** 
CENLURAT*CENplI
D 
 
 
 
–0.012 
(–1.130) 
 –0.002 
(–1.386) 
CENINSTRAT*CENp
lID 
 
 
 
–0.001 
(–0.654) 
 –0.000 
(–2.231)** 
R² 0.138 0.146 0.144 0.156 
Adjusted R² 0.111 0.112 0.118 0.123 
Δ Adjusted R²  0.001  0.005 
F-statistics 5.229** 4.347** 5.508** 4.718** 
p-value (F-stats) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.731 1.725 1.796 1.775 
VIF Range  1.055–2.965  1.055–2.965 
Ramsey RESET TEST:    
F-Test Stats (p-value) 1.575 (0.210) 1.681 (0.195) 0.020 (0.886) 0.352 (0.552) 
 
Notes: Sample size (N) = 370. The t-statistics are reported in 'parentheses'. The potential of autocorrelation is 
reduced using the Newey-West test. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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For the main independent variables, the regression results report that 
LUPER, LURAT and INSTRAT relate negatively with flipping activity, as 
predicted. Additionally, the negative relationships are consistent for both flipping 
activity models (column (i) for both initial models). The negative sign verifies the 
hypothesized role of lockup provision and institutional investors' participation in 
controlling flipping activity. This finding lends support to the proposition of this 
study that the three factors, collectively, restrict the supply of the IPOs for 
subsequent trading in the immediate aftermarket. The fact that both lockup 
provision parameters (period and ratio) relate to flipping activity significantly 
implies that the lockup period and the lockup ratio are effective tools to restrict 
the early supply of tradable shares, as suggested in Garfinkle et al. (2002) and 
Ofek and Richardson (2000). In addition to the effective role in directly 
restricting flipping activity, the lockup period and the lockup ratio could also be 
regarded as signalling mechanisms that transmit information about the quality 
and the future prospect of the issuing company. This is because, as suggested by 
some researchers (e.g., Brau et al., 2005; Mohan & Chen, 2001), insiders are in 
the best position to understand the true condition of the companies and foresee 
the growth prospects of the companies. Because retaining the new shares could 
indicate liquidity costs and a undiversified portfolio, investors will flip their new 
shares unless the benefits are greater than the costs of retaining them. Realising 
that insiders of low-quality companies cannot afford to mimic the actions of 
insiders of high-quality companies (Brau et al., 2005), uninformed investors 
interpret the action of the insiders in retaining a larger proportion of their shares 
during the longer lockup period as a good signal. Therefore, new or unaffected 
shareholders may not sell their shares at the earliest chance possible because the 
lockup period and lockup ratio serve as an indication of the quality of the issuing 
companies or a product warranty that the insiders will continue to be committed 
to the well-being of the companies. This explanation is another possible reason 
for the significant negative association between lockup provision (period and 
ratio) and flipping activity. 
 
Unlike the results of the significant influence of the lockup period and 
the lockup ratio on flipping activity, institutional investors' participation fails to 
have a significant influence on flipping activity, although the direction of the 
relationship is as hypothesised. The negative relationship indicates that to some 
extent, the participation of institutional investors in an IPO helps reduce flipping 
activity. As argued earlier, institutional investors tend to have "strong hand" and 
loyalty characteristics such that they have less motivation to sell their shares 
immediately upon the IPO listing. Given the insignificant relationship, however, 
the arguments are only weakly supported. To a certain extent, the findings of this 
study are somewhat consistent with the results documented in the US (e.g., Bash, 
2001; Krigman et al., 1999), which show that institutional investors tend to keep 
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their shares for a long period, although the results in the US are conditional upon 
the IPOs' being overpriced.  
 
The discussion now continues on the essential issue raised in this study: 
the moderating effect of pre-listing investor demand on the influence of lockup 
provision (period and ratio) and institutional investors' participation on flipping 
activity. As reported in Table 3, the lockup period, the lockup ratio and 
institutional investors reinforce their effectiveness in reducing flipping activity 
through the restriction in the supply of the new shares in the immediate 
aftermarket because they are found to significantly relate with flipping activity 
negatively even after the moderation effects (LUPER × plID, LURAT × plID and 
INSTRAT × plID) are included in both of the moderated models (column (ii) in 
Models A and B). Although the interactions between LUPER and plID and 
between INSTRAT and plID are found to be significant in modFLIP model, the 
interaction between LURAT and plID fails to exhibit similar significant result in 
any model. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), this study recognises that the 
moderating effect of pre-listing investor demand exists significantly in only the 
relationships between the lockup period and flipping activity and between 
institutional investors' participation and flipping activity. 
 
Despite the significant moderating effect of investor demand on the 
influence of the lockup period and institutional investors' participation, the results 
of this study show that the intensity of investor demand prior to listing does not 
influence the role of LURAT in controlling flipping activity. That is, the fact that 
the interactions between LUPER and plID and INSTRAT and plID relate to 
flipping activity negatively challenges the argument forwarded in this study that 
pre-listing investor demand weakens the restrictive role of the lockup period and 
institutional investors. On the contrary, this study finds that pre-listing investor 
demand strengthens the influence of the lockup period and institutional investors' 
participation on flipping activity models (Column (ii) in Model A and Model B 
of Table 3). A possible explanation for this finding is that the investor demand  
prior to the listing works as a verification of the quality of the companies. A 
bandwagon effect would be expected but only later in the immediate aftermarket, 
when uninformed investors would also try to join in. Recognising this signal, 
successful subscribers will hold on to their highly demanded shares because they 
expect a higher profit from further price appreciation in the future. Rationally, 
firm value is expected to increase in high-quality companies because they are 
more able to secure growth opportunities. Overall, the findings of this study 
suggest that as predicted, pre-listing investor demand significantly moderates the 
influence of the lockup period and institutional investors but in a way that it 
strengthens the role of these predictors in restricting flipping activity. Therefore, 
the earlier proposition about the role of pre-listing investor demand in reducing 
the effectiveness of the three main predictors to limit flipping activity is 
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somehow not supported. Instead, the finding suggests that pre-listing investor 
demand reinforces the effectiveness of lockup provision and institutional investor 
participation in restricting flipping activity. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study investigates the role of pre-listing investor demand in moderating the 
relationship between the lockup provision (period and ratio) and flipping activity 
and between institutional investors' participation and flipping activity in 370 
Malaysian IPOs listed from January 2000 to December 2012. The main 
contribution of this study is the emphasis on the moderating effect of pre-listing 
investor demand on the influence of lockup provision and institutional investors' 
participation on shareholders' decision to flip their shares in the immediate 
aftermarket. This study deviates somewhat from extant studies on flipping 
activity that concentrate on other variables, such as initial return, investor 
demand, underwriters' reputation and offer size, and other studies on lockup 
provision that focus on only the role of lockup provision on the IPO underpricing 
or initial return on the immediate aftermarket or on the market reaction on the 
expiration day of the lockup provision. 
 
The main findings of this study reveal that the lockup provision (period 
and ratio) and institutional investors' participation are negatively related to the 
flipping activity of Malaysian IPOs. However, a significant influence is found in 
only the lockup period and the lockup ratio. The negative associations are 
consistent with the argument forwarded in this study that the three predictors 
work in restricting flipping activity through their role in controlling the supply of 
the new shares in the immediate aftermarket. Similarly important, the negative 
relationship between the three predictors and flipping activity also reflects the 
quality of the issuing companies if explanations about their roles are sought from 
the signalling theory. More importantly, this study finds that pre-listing investor 
demand strengthens the restrictive role of the three predictors because their 
explanatory power is found to improve upon incorporating the interaction terms 
in the models. This finding implies that issuers and underwriters could also rely 
on the joint influence of pre-listing investor demand in cases where flipping 
activities are expected to be excessive and adversely affect firm value. Alanazi 
and Liu's (2013) argument that excess (pre-listing) investor demand creates 
excess supply in the immediate aftermarket, which drives flipping activity down 
due to increases in IPO price, does not seem to be supported in this study because 
as shown in Table 3, price appreciation (PA) has a consistently significant 
positive effect on flipping activity.  
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In brief, this study provides new findings concerning how flipping 
activity is influenced by lockup provision and institutional investors' 
participation, particularly when the indirect effect of pre-listing investor demand 
is considered. These findings are expected to be the main contribution to the 
literature on IPO flipping activity. However, more extensive examinations are 
still needed before any strong conclusion on the influence of lockup provision, 
institutional investors' participation and pre-listing investor demand can be 
drawn. For instance, future studies should look deeper into the flipping activity of 
investors by separating it into retail versus institutional. Institutional investors are 
expected to behave differently from retail investors because the former are 
commonly perceived as the more informed investors. Signalling effects (such as 
through lockup provision) should be less prevalent in IPOs selected by 
institutional investors relative to IPOs that are heavily allocated to retail investors 
because the former investors are information-opaque; therefore, information 
asymmetry issues in these IPOs become less significant.  
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APPENDIX  
Summary of share moratorium rules (as stipulated in equity guidelines) 
 
Amendment date Affected companies and terms of share moratorium 
January 1996*  
 
Main Board (only on companies in construction, service and specialised 
activities) and Second Board (all companies). 
An option of either 3-year profit guarantee or 3-year share moratorium. 
3 May 1999 
 
Main Board (only on companies in construction, service and specialised 
activities), Second Board (all companies) and MESDAQ (all companies). 
A moratorium of 45% for at least 1 year. Thereafter, 20% disposal for 
Main Board and MESDAQ and 15% for Second Board, per annum on 
straight line basis. 
2002 MESDAQ (all companies).  
A moratorium of 45% for 1 year. Thereafter, 1/3 disposal per annum on 
straight line basis. 
1 May 2003  
 
Main Board (only property development and construction companies), 
Infrastructure Project Companies (IPCs) and Second Board (all 
companies).  
For all applicants, a moratorium of 45% for 1 year. Thereafter, 1/3 disposal 
per annum on straight line basis. For IPCs, a moratorium of 45% for at 
least 1 year and continue until generate operating revenue (OR). After 1 
year + OR, 1/2 disposal per annum on straight line basis. 
2004** MESDAQ (all companies).  
A moratorium of 45% for 1 year. Thereafter, 1/3 disposal per annum on 
straight line basis. 
1 February 2008  
 
Main Board (all companies), IFCs, and Second Board (all companies).  
For all applicants, a moratorium on entire shareholding for 6 months. For 
IFCs, a moratorium of 45% for 1 year and continue until generate operating 
revenue (OR). After 1 year + OR, 1/2 disposal per annum on straight line 
basis. 
1 February 2008  
 
MESDAQ (all companies).  
A moratorium of 45% for 1 year. Thereafter, 1/3 disposal per annum on 
straight line basis. 
3 August 2009  
 
Main Market (all companies) and IFCs 
A moratorium on the entire shareholdings for 6 months. For IFC, this 
moratorium will only be lifted up provided 1-year OR, or else 45% which 
will be lifted up once OR is realised. 
September 2011  
 
MESDAQ (all companies). 
A moratorium on the entire shareholdings for 6 months. Upon expiry, a 
moratorium of 45% for the next 6 months. Thereafter, 1/3 disposal per 
annum on straight line basis. 
 
Note: Item marked with * is sourced from Ahmad Zaluki (2005) while ** from Lee et al. (2004). The others are 
from the Securities Commission. 
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